Introduction
A comprehensive new report on UN peace operations by a High-level Independent Panel has just appeared: Uniting Our Strengths for Peace -Politics, Partnership and People (hereafter the "2015 Report"). 1 In its Executive Summary the Report speaks of the changed and changing environment facing UN peace operations. "UN peace operations have proven highly adaptable and contributed significantly to the successful resolution of conflicts and to a declining number of conflicts over two decades. Today, however, there is evidence of a worrisome reversal of some of this trend and a widely shared concern that changes in conflict may be outpacing the ability of UN peace operations to respond. The spread of violent extremism, overlaid into long-simmering local or regional conflicts and the growing aspirations of populations for change, is placing pressure on governments and the international system to respond. As UN peace operations struggle to achieve their objectives, change is required to adapt them to new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness and appropriate use in future." 2 The new report comes at a time of major divisions between states about the rules governing peacekeeping: there are debates as to the interpretation of the traditional principles of peacekeeping, the proper scope of the use of force by peacekeeping forces and the primary role of the Security Council in the context of its relationship with troop-contributing countries. 3 Much controversy has been provoked by recent peacekeeping operations in Africa. Have the operations in Mali and the DRC brought a fundamental change of approach? If so, is this a desirable development? The divisions between states on the desirability of robust peacekeeping and on the protection of civilians were very apparent in recent General Assembly debates and in the debates of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping. 4 The 2015 Report has been published 15 years after the influential Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations which had been drawn up for the UN Millennium Summit (2000). 5 Since then there have been many significant developments. The assumption on which the Brahimi Report was based -that the UN would launch only one new major operation each year -has been overtaken. In the twenty-first century, there has been a massive surge in peacekeeping since 2003; this has led to concern about overstretch. The UN has experienced serious difficulties in obtaining enough personnel and equipment for its peacekeeping operations. Today there are sixteen peacekeeping operations, nine of which are in Africa. They include over 100,000
military and police personnel, compared with just 34,000 in 2000. The peacekeeping budget for the current year is nearly US$ 8.5 billion, an apparently very large amount that exceeds the UN's current regular budget of US$ 5.5 billion, but -to put it into perspective -an amount which is only about 0.5% of total world military spending.
The experience of peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report created a new awareness of the danger of relapse into conflict after a peacekeeping operation is withdrawn. For example, in the Central African Republic terrible inter-communal violence broke out in 2012 after the departure of an earlier UN peacekeeping operation. Liberia returned to conflict in 2003 after an earlier peacekeeping operation had completed its task in 1997. Somalia was without an effective and stable government for many years after the UN peacekeeping operation was withdrawn in 1995; even today the security situation is extremely fragile and the AU force, AMISOM, struggles to fulfil its mandate. This awareness of the danger of relapse has led to a renewed focus on peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Commission set up following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report currently operates in six African states. 6 Moreover, there is a corresponding focus on "multidimensional" peacekeeping operations, operations that are designed to secure the transition from conflict to stable government. Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. In response to these concerns that the presence of a peacekeeping operation may just freeze a situation, peacekeeping operations today typically conduct regular strategic reviews of their size and mandate, and plan for their exit strategy. For example, the government of the DRC and the UN have entered into a strategic dialogue to develop a road map and exit strategy for MONUSCO. 13 This was set up to succeed an earlier UN peacekeeping operation, MONUC, after stability had been restored to most of the DRC. Serious violence against civilians had continued in the east, and MONUSCO was established under Security Council Resolution 1925 Resolution (2010 to use all necessary means to protect civilians, and to contribute to stabilization and peace consolidation in that difficult environment.
The 2015 Report
The The 2015 Report in its Calls for Change therefore proposes "four essential shifts" in the design and implementation of peace operations. 18 First, politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations. Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions. Second, the full spectrum of UN peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground. 19 Third, a stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership is needed for the future, meaning increased cooperation with regional organizations.
Fourth, the UN Secretariat must become more field-focused and UN peace operations must be more people-centred. The report then goes on to set out "new approaches" for UN peace operations: conflict prevention and mediation must be brought to the fore; 
25
This increasingly prominent aspect of peacekeeping is one on which there are differences between states. The protection of civilians may seem an obviously laudable aim, but it is not unproblematic. First, several states argue that provisions for the protection of civilians should not serve as a pretext for intervention. 26 They were apparently led to take this position in response to the NATO-led operation in Libya authorized the use of all necessary means "to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack". Russia argued that a mandate requiring the protection of civilians creates a danger that UN peacekeeping operations could compromise their neutrality and be drawn into internal political conflicts in such a way that they support one of the parties. 27 Second, some states have stressed that such mandates will raise expectations and that it is important that the operations be given the resources necessary to carry out their mandate to protect civilians. In the 2014 Security Council debate on the protection of civilians several states stressed the practical problems.
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Some argued that the UN operations in South Sudan and the CAR, whose mandates gave express priority to the protection of civilians, demonstrated these difficulties.
When operations were first given the mandate to protect civilians, not much attention Their mandates were drawn up in response to violence against civilians in ongoing conflicts, and the protection of civilians was made the explicit priority of the peacekeeping operations.
New approaches: Clarity on the use of force
The third "new approach" set out in the 2015 Report is the call for "clarity on the use of force and in the role of UN peace operations in managing conflict". The Brahimi Report recommended a two-step process to avoid the problems of the commitment gap: new peacekeeping operations should not be established until member states had guaranteed sufficient personnel and equipment to enable the peacekeeping operation to carry out its mandate. But in practice this recommendation was never implemented. It ran up against the pressure on the UN and on member states to take action in response to a crisis. Even after the Brahimi Report it continued to be the norm rather than the exception for the UN to establish an operation before it had the necessary resources. A central concern of the Brahimi Report was the need for the rapid deployment of troops and equipment, and it made detailed recommendations designed to achieve this aim, but UN peacekeeping operations today still face serious problems in obtaining personnel and equipment. In practice the UN still turns to regional organizations and to individual member states for the first response to a conflict. In Mali it was an African-led force (with France) that first responded to the advances of separatist and terrorist forces in 2013. In the CAR, when inter-communal violence escalated in 2013, it was an AU mission (with France) that was authorized to go in first, to take all necessary measures to contribute to the protection of civilians, the stabilization of the country, the restoration of state authority over the whole territory of the country.
The 2015 Report calls for rapid deployment. It says that "slow deployment is one of the greatest impediments to more effective peace operations. When a missions trickles into a highly demanding environment, it is dangerously exposed on the ground and initial high expectations turn to disappointment, frustration and anger." Report now proposes that a small UN vanguard capacity should be considered to allow the UN to insert a quick-responding UN military force into a new area, or to reinforce an existing mission. A reliable system of fast-responding regional or Member State capabilities is required for the future, based on national standby arrangements. This would provide a first response capacity where slower-deploying UN peace operations
were not a viable option for a crisis. 57 The Secretary-General's Report on the implementation of the 2015 Report accordingly puts forward faster and more agile peacekeeping operations as the second key change to be achieved. 58 The 2015 Report says that, given the growing needs for more advanced capabilities in missions, it is crucial to reverse the decline in contributions from many high-capability countries. As regards the supply of troops by developed states, the 2015 Report is more outspoken than the Brahimi Report had been. Developed states at the time of the 2015 Report made only a small contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping. 59 The special strategic military cell that they provided to UNIFIL when its size was increased and its mandate was It seems that this recommendation has met receptive ears; it has certainly produced a very quick response. The USA will not itself make any significant increase in the number of troops it provides, but it did organize a meeting of over 50 states on 28
September 2015 for a Leaders' Summit on UN Peace Operations to pledge new commitments. 61 It was reported that member states have pledged 40,000 more troops and police, more than 40 helicopters, 15 military engineering companies and 10 field hospitals. 62 China made the largest commitment of troops: it said it would establish a standby force of 8,000 soldiers. But it expressed concern that peacekeeping should not be exploited for political ends. The basic principles of peacekeeping should be strictly followed. There are indeed concerns about the involvement of all the permanent members of the Security Council in peacekeeping, concerns that they will pursue their own political and economic ends. Report says that the ability of field commanders to ensure performance is severely hampered by the use of caveats and national controls. It may be necessary for the Secretariat to decline an offer of troops if the caveats will impede performance. In the field any further caveats beyond those accepted at the outset cannot be condoned.
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Empowering the Field (3): strengthening global-regional partnerships
The 2015 Report devotes significantly more attention than the Brahimi Report to the relationship between the UN and regional organizations with regard to peacekeeping. 72 It builds on developments since the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which had called for a stronger relationship. 73 Much has already been done since then to strengthen the relationship between the UN and regional organizations, in particular the AU, and to build up the peacekeeping capacity of the AU. The UN-AU partnership has come a long way over the past decade. 74 Recent experience in the CAR, Mali and Somalia has shown that troops from regional countries are essential as first responders, and that they have often brought political commitment, understanding of the context, and a direct link to regional political influence and leverage. As we have seen above, the 2015 Report refers to the need to rely on regional organizations as first-responders to protect civilians, for conflict management and for counter-terrorism operations. Yet many states have cautioned that there are potential political risks to regional engagement where national interests of neighbouring countries may not be compatible with the intended direction of peace efforts. 75 In very general terms the 2015 Report now calls on the UN "to craft a collective vision for a future global and regional architecture to maintain international peace and security."
The UN Secretary-General is to "begin building a consensus for such a vision and to propose a roadmap to realize it over the next decade." In response, the Secretary-General has announced that the UN and the AU are taking steps to finalize in 2016 a Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security.
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The main practical issue (and one with constitutional implications) identified in the 2015 Report is that of financing for regional peacekeeping operations. The lack of sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support AU peace operations undermines their sustainability and effectiveness. 77 The AU has for many years been calling for the UN to fund its regional peacekeeping operations from the UN peacekeeping budget when the AU operations were authorized by the UN Security Council; the 2015 Report now supports this call "on a case-by-case basis". The AU in its response to the 2015 Report argues strongly for this change. 78 It does, however, expressly affirm that any enforcement action by the AU must be authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII. Leaders' Summit on Peace Operations, but it has led to some concern that the P5 will come to dominate or to transform the nature of peacekeeping.
The Secretary-General has argued in his report on the implementation of the 2015
Report that the lack of unity among states over the scope and application of the three traditional peacekeeping principles was thwarting their adaptation. peacekeeping is being questioned in this regard, and with regard to the relationship of the UN and "first responders" such as the AU.
